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Abstract
We introduce the notion of Tuned Risk Aversion as a possible interpretation
of non-expected utility preferences. It refers to tuning patterns of risk (and
ambiguity) aversion to the composition of a lottery (or act) at hand, assuming
only an overall `budget' for accumulated risk aversion over its sub-lotteries.
This makes the risk aversion level applied to a part intrinsically depending
on the whole, in a way that turns out to be in line with frequently observed
deviations from the Sure-Thing Principle. This is illustrated by applying the
concept to the Allais paradox and to the 50:51 example, related to ambiguity
aversion. We give a general justication for applying the method in contexts
where the law of one price does not hold, and derive unique updating from
a substitution axiom induced by a non-recursive form of consistency. In a
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third example, we propose a solution to a well-known puzzle on consistency
of decision making in the Ellsberg paradox.
Keywords: Allais paradox, Ellsberg paradox, ambiguity aversion, dynamic
consistency, Sure-Thing Principle, preference updating
1 Introduction
There is an abundance of evidence that risk attitudes towards a compound lottery, or
act, cannot be properly understood in terms of risk attitudes towards each of its sub-
lotteries separately, contrary to the implications of the von Neumann-Morgenstern
expected utility framework. Since the famous example of Allais, decades of empirical
and theoretical research have identied systematic aspects in human decision making
that clearly violate the Independence Axiom underlying expected utility. This has
resulted in several explanations why the risk attitude towards a sub-lottery may
depend on payos that are no longer relevant once the sub-lottery would realize,
in terms of psychological factors as regret, framing, and subjective perception of
small probabilities. These perspectives have led to various proposals for modeling
so-called non-expected utility preferences. We refer to Machina and Viscusi (2013)
for a recent overview on this topic. Despite agreement on the observed facts, there
is still some controversy whether these deviations should be interpreted as biases
of the human mind, comparable to optical illusions, or biases in the Independence
Axiom itself, rendering it as less rational than it seems to be at rst sight. Our
approach supports the latter view, by pointing at a straightforward explanation in
terms of Tuned Risk Aversion (TRA), which is inspired by recent ndings in research
on non-recursive valuation in the context of nonlinear pricing and risk measures in
nance, see Roorda and Schumacher (2013) (henceforth rs13) and the references
therein.
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The idea of TRA is best explained in the setting of a two-stage lottery, with
only three degrees of risk aversion considered per stage: low, medium, high. To all
the nine combinations possible we can associate an induced `overall' degree of risk
aversion, applying to the lottery as a whole. Let us assume that a moderately risk
averse person considers the following three combinations as not too conservative
(a) medium in both stages, (b) rst low, then high, and (c) the other way around.
Variants are possible, of course, but the point is that in general there are level curves
of overall risk aversion consisting of dierent patterns of distributing it. Tuned Risk
Aversion, in this simple context, amounts to applying all three possibilities in this
tuning set, and then selecting the one with minimum outcome. For example, if there
is only risk in the second stage, (b) will be chosen, while (c) is most eective if only
the rst stage is risky. In this way risk aversion is tuned to the compound lottery
as a whole, by `spending' it `economically', where it hurts most.
Natural as it seems, this example immediately raises serious concerns about
consistency of the induced preferences, certainly for the experts in the eld. Non-
expected utility itself is already debated critically, and there is an additional issue
concerning dynamic consistency. It seems that we allow for a discrepancy between
making conditional decisions in a certain state beforehand and when that state
actually materializes, so that recursiveness is lost.
We will carefully address these concerns. First we explain why TRA is indeed
incompatible with the law of one price, and we show that relaxing this law pulls
the sting out of the common `make book' arguments against violations of the Sure-
Thing Principle. These considerations lead a revision of the notion of simple acts
as building blocks of compound acts. We then propose the notion of sequential
consistency, introduced in Roorda and Schumacher (2007), as a form of dynamic
consistency that ts the idea of TRA much better than the far more restrictive axiom
of recursiveness. We show that it is strong enough to induce unique updates of initial
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preferences, and formulate a substitution axiom (which we call c-Substitution) that
produces this update, if it exists. This axiom may be of independent interest.
TRA is illustrated by applications to three well-known paradoxes. Firstly, we
show that the observed violation of the independece axiom in the Allais paradox is
perfectly in line with TRA, in a way that largely conrms the well-known behavioral
explanations in terms of framing and regret. These stylized ndings suggest that
TRA can be seen as a rational mechanism through which these phenomena have their
eect. The eect of combining standard exponential utility with TRA is depicted
in a Marschak-Machina triangle.
We then explore TRA in the so-called 50:51 example, introduced in Machina
(2009) in the context of ambiguity aversion, in Section 6. This example reveals some
limitations of Choquet Expected Utilities (CEU) preferences in capturing intuitive
tradeos between ambiguity and risk aversion, due to the so-called tail-separability
property inherent in CEU. In Baillon et al. (2011) it is shown that many alternative
approaches to non-expected utility suer from this anomaly as well. We will show
that an elementary form of TRA added to CEU preferences already suces to
overcome this problem.
In a third example, we discuss consistent decision making in the Ellsberg para-
dox, following the two-stage formulation in Hanany and Klibano (2007). The ana-
lysis conrms consistency of updating by c-Substitution, which in this case amounts
to Bayesian updating of preferences, if the absence of the law of one price is carefully
taken into account.
This paper is organized as follows. The formal denition of TRA is given after
the introduction, followed by a section devoted to the justication of the violation
of the Sure-Thing Principle that it involves. In Section 4 we describe sequential
consistency and the induced unique updating rule by c-Substitution. The three
subsequent sections contain the three applications, and conclusions follow in Section
4
8. Regularity conditions and proofs are collected in an appendix.
Placement in the literature and contribution
The setup in this paper is mathematically simple, in that state spaces are assumed
to be nite. Its scope is quite general, however, due to the fact that it does not refer
to probabilities, and hence no formal distinction has to be made between risk and
ambiguity at the outset. In other words, the setup applies to acts, including objec-
tive or subjective lotteries as special case. Moreover, we also abstract from specic
shapes of preference functions, and only assume that they are continuous, monotone,
and strictly monotone on constants. This makes it compatible with a wide variety
of non-expected utility frameworks, including Cumulative Prospect Theory (PT)
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Wakker and Tversky, 1993), Rank-Dependent Util-
ity (RDU) (Quiggin, 1982), Maxmin and Choquet Expected Utility (MEU, CEU)
(Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989; Schmeidler, 1989), Vector Expected Utility (VEU)
(Siniscalchi, 2009), Dynamic Variational Preferences (VP) (Maccheroni et al., 2006),
and Expected Uncertain Utility (EUU) (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2014).
The distinctive feature of TRA is that it combines non-recursiveness with a spe-
cic form of updating that does not rely on the Sure-Thing Principle. Relaxing
recursiveness makes it dierent from most models in MEU, VP, CEU, and RDU.
PT and VEU concentrate on behavioral aspects of updating, while we derive it
straightforwardly from a consistency property, without reference to probabilities.
This updating rule is compared to notions in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993); Sinis-
calchi (2009); Gumen and Savochkin (2013); Maccheroni et al. (2006) in Section 3,
and to Hanany and Klibano (2007) in Section 7. To our knowledge, the proposed
update rule has not been used before in the literature on non-expected utility.1
1It is closely related to the conditionally consistent updating rule in (Roorda and Schumacher,
2007, Def. 3.1) and the renement update introduced in rs13, but extends their scope to preference
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Also the rened notion of sub-acts, as elementary building blocks of compound
acts, is new.2 The idea to keep track of more than one conditional utility level per
state is also present in VEU and EUU, but used dierently. Further comparison at
this point is an interesting point of future research.
Perhaps the main contribution does not lie in the ideas themselves, which are
elementary, but rather in their justication. By three classical examples we show
that several paradoxes resolve if absence of the law of one price is carefully taken into
account. This may give rise to reconsider the degree of rationality of well-observed
aspects of human judgment and decision making, and inuence directions of future
research in this eld.
Some potential applications of TRA that fall outside the scope of this paper
concern prudence, hyperbolic discounting, and incomplete preferences; their link
with TRA is briey indicated in Section 8. Concerning the empirical aspect, we view
the estimation of the shape of non-rectangular tuning sets as an interesting topic for
experiments. The fact that dynamic preferences may still be parameterized by just
one parameter under TRA may enhance the formulation and testing of hypotheses.
2 Denition of TRA
The denition of TRA applies to compound acts, for which we use the following
notation. We assume a nite state space S = fs1; : : : ; sng for the rst stage acts.
The act with consequence, or outcome, xi in state si is denoted as (x1; s1; : : : ;xn; sn),
functions that not necessarily satisfy the axiom of translation invariance (which is, together with
monotonicity, the dening property of so-called monetary risk measures, see Follmer and Schied
(2011)).
2A similar idea is mentioned in Roorda and Schumacher (2014), as a topic of future research
on convex risk measures.
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or, in vector notation, as (x; s). A simple act3 has x 2 Rn, a compound act has xi
consisting of another act, called a (second stage) sub-act, on some nite state space
Si.
4 The set of all compound acts on S is denoted as A, that of simple acts on S
as Asimple. The sub-act of f 2 A in state s 2 S is denoted as fs, which may be a
simple or compound act.
An act with the same consequence c 2 R in all states is called a sure thing, or
the constant (act) c, or a sure amount c. We use the same notation for sure things
on dierent state spaces.
We take our starting point in given (ordinal) preference functions, parameterized
by a risk aversion parameter, for the simple acts in the rst stage, and for the second
stage acts in each state of S. We call c 2 R a certainty equivalent (in the weak sense,
as we explain later on) of an act f under preference function V , if f is indierent
to the sure amount c under V . To ensure existence and uniqueness, we assume that
all given preference functions are monotone, continuous, and strictly monotone on
sure things c 2 R.5
Under Tuned Risk Aversion we will compare the outcomes of several preference
functions, relating to dierent patterns of risk aversion. Therefore it is convenient
to replace the ordinal preference functions by the induced certainty equivalence
functions, which represent exactly the same preference ordering, but at the same
time have intrinsically dened units, because they are normalized on constants.
So we will assume that the following certainty equivalent functions are given
3This should not be confused with the use of the adjective `simple' to indicate that an act has
nite range, as e.g. in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993).
4Probabilistic or deterministic dependencies between states are not incorporated at the outset;
they may be incorporated by specifying a joint distribution on all subsets of states in [i=1;:::;nSi.
5An a priori restriction of outcomes to a subinterval X  R can be handled without di-
culty. Incorporation of state-dependent restrictions for outcomes of second stage acts seems less
straightforward.
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 cea : Asimple ! R for a 2 A, with A  R denoting a range of risk aversion
levels over the rst stage.
 cceb : A ! Rn, with cceb(f)(s) the certainty equivalent of fs in state s 2 S
for b 2 B  Rn, with B specifying given ranges of risk aversion levels for the
second stage in each state. The vector cceb(f) is identied with a simple act.
TRA is dened as taking the worst outcome over dierent patterns of risk (and/or
ambiguity) aversion over the stages.
Definition 2.1 Tuned Risk Aversion, specied by a non-empty set R  A 
B, corresponds to the preference ordering represented by the certainty equivalent
function on compound acts given by
(2.1) CER(f) = inf
(a;b)2R
cea(cceb(f)):
Some remarks are in order here. As we explained in the introduction, the crux
of TRA is that R, which we call the tuning set, need not be rectangular, but may
reect mutual restrictions between a and b. In that respect it is more general than
the recursive utility approach, as described in Epstein and Schneider (2003). In
Section 4 we describe the notion of sequential consistency, a form of so-called weak
time consistency, which allows for non-rectangular tuning sets.
For lotteries, an obvious choice is to let a = 0 and b = 0 correspond to tak-
ing (conditional) expectations. A standard way to mirror positive to negative lev-
els in nonlinear pricing is by setting ce a(f) =   cea( f), see e.g. Cherny and
Madan (2010); negative levels then pertain to selling rather than buying f , and
risk/ambiguity neutrality for acts then means that ce0(f) =   ce0( f).
In the examples we will always have that the inmum that denes CER is a
minimum, so that for all compound acts an optimally tuned pattern of risk aversion
exists.
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The notion of an overall level of risk aversion can be formalized by specifying a
parameterized family of nested sets (R)2  with    R, and we can write CE for
CER . The denition can then be applied recursively in the obvious way. We come
back to this issue in the next section.
We have assumed a single risk aversion parameter for each stage, resp. a 2 A; b 2
B, but we could also incorporate dierent types of risk aversion in each stage, leading
to higher dimensional sets A and B. In fact, the example in Section 6 suggests an
extension in this direction.
To streamline the exposition, we collect some technicalities and proofs in the
appendix. This includes the standard properties of certainty equivalence functions,
labeled (p1-3) in Section 9.1, three regularity conditions (r1-3) which guarantee
that the inmum in (2.1) is a minimum, a sensitivity condition (r4) for cea, and
conditions on the risk aversion parameterization, labeled (p4) and (r5).
3 Consistency issues
Before we describe the notion of consistency that we impose in TRA, we make the
general point that there need not be a trace of irrationality in violations of the
Sure-Thing Principle. This is crucial for the appreciation of all other results.
For the sake of the argument, we will consider an agent with an initial cer-
tainty equivalence function CE : A ! R, today at t = 0, and conditional certainty
equivalence function cce : A ! Rn tomorrow, at t = 1.
To avoid confusion in terminology, we rst have to disentangle two interpreta-
tions of the certainty equivalent of a sub-act: the weak one, as replacement value
of outcomes within the sublottery, and a strong one, pertaining to the replacement
of the sub-act itself in the compound act. Notice that cce relates to the weak in-
terpretation, and that the Sure-Thing Principle requires that the initial preference
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CE validates the strong interpretation for cce as well.
Although there may be valid psychological considerations to explain discrepan-
cies between making conditional decisions in a certain state beforehand (according
to CE) and when that state actually realizes (according to cce), our justication of
TRA is not relying on this. Instead, we will consider a professional agent whose
imagination is strong enough to anticipate regret, and who takes the model serious
enough to stick to his plan, at least as a thought experiment. Hence, we will not
allow for any other certainty equivalent in the strong sense than given by the vector
function cce. The crucial question is: does it exist?
If it does, this in fact implies that the agent is willing to exchange sub-acts fs
for cce(f)(s) and vice versa. The hidden assumption is that the agent's preferences
obey the law of one price: the amount c given for obtaining an act, is the same as
the amount asked in return for the act.6 This may be a perfectly valid assumption
in e.g. a context of a frictionless market. We hardly see any room for TRA if the
law of one price holds.
However, this law is an idealization, and even highly competitive markets may
exhibit considerable bid-ask spreads, due to market frictions and unhedgeable un-
certainty. The very existence of bid-ask spreads is apparently not a matter of ir-
rationality. This implies that two preference orderings coexist, CEbid and CEask,
which may be strongly related, e.g. by the rule CEask(f) =  CEbid( f), but do
not coincide. Let us assume that CE and cce relate to ask prices.
The Sure-Thing Principle now turns its sterner face: it implies that the ask price
6The term `law of one price' as we use it here is most appropriate in a market context. Assuming
that sure things c trade for c, hence assuming outcomes in monetary units and ignoring risk-free
discounting, it amounts to the assumption that for all acts f there exists price c 2 R such that
both f   c and c   f are market opportunities, i.e., indierent to 0. A term that would better
reect our general setting, not restricted to a market context, would be `the law of one type of
preference', but this is a little long-winded.
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of today only depends on conditional ask prices of tomorrow, regardless the spread
that will prevail at that day. In other words, recursion in ask and bid prices should
be fully separated.
A seemingly strong argument for this separation is that otherwise always a pair
of acts f; g can be found with CE(f) < CE(g) yet cce(f)(s)  cce(g)(s) in all states
s 2 S. However, as we have shown in (rs13, Example 3.9), such a twist is perfectly
explained as an eect of f having lower conditional bid prices than g. Bid and
ask prices may be jointly recursive, so that at t = 0 a sub-act must be represented
by two gures, and market frictions eectively invalidate the standard `make book'
arguments against it.
Summarizing our point, it is obvious that two dierent complete preference or-
derings may coexist in a rational way, and the Sure-Thing Principle overlooks that
they can be intertwined without causing anomalies.
The subtle aspect is that, because t = 0 has been a future moment in the past,
the initial preference itself is partial and complete at the same time: complete in
the technical sense of orderings, but partial, in the sense that also other types of
initial preferences matter. Even more subtle, in our example the one ordering can
be derived from the other, by the rule given above, so that CE is still complete as a
model specication of initial preferences. Combined with uniqueness of updates, as
we address in the next section, it would even implicitly determine cce. So, despite
its incompleteness as decision criterion, CE may fully specify all modeling aspects
of interest.
Extended simple acts as building blocks in TRA
We conclude this section by translating these observations to an alternative formu-
lation of TRA, that brings back the idea of recursion. From (2.1) it is obvious what
the relevant features of a sub-act fs in state s 2 S are under TRA: the outcomes
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of cceb(f) in s for for the entire range of risk aversion levels b that occur in R. So
under TRA, the standard substitution axiom should be weakened accordingly, by
only requiring that preferences do not change if a sub-act is replaced by another one
that is equivalent in this strong sense. This gives rise to a dierent view on what
the elementary building blocks of compound acts are. If the interface of sub-act fs
in state s 2 S with the compound act f is the entire mapping ~fs : b 7! cceb(f)(s),
this means that f can be viewed as a simple act on S only with an extended
specication of consequences per state, consisting of the entire mapping ~fs, rather
than one number. So an extended simple act takes the form (~x; s), with extended
specication ~x = (xb)b2B. The substitution axiom described above now amounts
to reduction of compound lotteries f to extended simple acts ~f , as intermediate
outcome in evaluating TRA backward recursively. In a multi-stage recursion, the
single-step valuations become conditional mappings from extended simple acts to
extended outcomes for a range of risk aversion levels. Let  denote the parameter
of overall risk aversion, specied by a nested series of tuning sets R  = (R)2 , cf.
Section 2. With slight abuse of notation, we can apply CE to ~f in the obvious way,
and dene CE  := (CE)2 . Dynamic certainty equivalence functions for TRA can
be seen as recursively composed of this type of building blocks in each state.
4 Sequential consistency and unique updating
We have argued in the introduction that recursiveness is too restrictive for TRA.
So, assuming that initial and conditional preferences are specied by resp. CE and
cce, as before, we do not impose the rule
(4.1) CE(f) = CE(cce(f)):
Inspired by rs13, we propose to replace this by the much weaker condition of se-
quential consistency, which requires that CE(f) is in the range of cce(f). By this
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we mean that for all f 2 A,
(4.2) CE(f) 2 [min cce(f);max cce(f)];
with the boundaries of the interval resp. the minimum and maximum element of
the vector cce(f). In other words, certainty equivalents (in the weak sense) do not
increase or decrease for sure. Notice that this makes sense for bid- and ask prices,
even if their dynamics are intertwined, and that in this way straightforward arbitrage
opportunities are ruled out.7 The following characterization further underlines the
strong intuition of this concept.8
Proposition 4.1 Sequential consistency (4.2) is equivalent to the condition
(4.3) cce(f) = c ) CE(f) = c:
In a forward looking perspective, cce is called a sequentially consistent update
of CE if the condition above holds true. Following the line of reasoning in rs13, we
derive uniqueness of sequentially consistent updates in TRA, under some mild regu-
larity conditions, and formulate a substitution axiom, which we call c-Substitution,
that provides the update if it exists. The unique update extends the renement
update described in rs13 to value functions that are not necessarily translation in-
variant.
We use the following notation. For a given tuning set R, dene the vector R as
the point-wise supremum of second-stage levels that occur in R, i.e.,
(4.4) R := supR1 2 Rn with R1 := fb 2 B j (a; b) 2 R for some a 2 Ag:
7Absence of arbitrage opportunities by dynamic strategies is easily obtained in a context of a
market with frictions and possibly perfectly liquid hedging opportunities, cf. rs13, Section 5.
8A similar characterization is given in rs13, restricted to c = 0. For so-called monetary valua-
tions, which satisfy the axiom of translation invariance, V (f + c) = V (f) + c, the criterion (4.3)
then follows.
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The regularity conditions in the theorem below are described in Section 9.1.
Theorem 4.2 The pair (CER; cce) is sequentially consistent if  is the maximum
element of R1 dened in (4.4), i.e., (i)  = R and (ii) R 2 R1.
Under the regularity conditions (r1-5), cceR is the unique candidate for a se-
quentially consistent update of CER, and it has this property if and only if (ii) holds
for R the maximal tuning set representing CER, which is given by (9.2).
The unique candidate, cceR , is characterized by the following axiom.
Axiom 4.3 (c-Substitution) If a subact g in state s 2 S has conditional certainty
equivalent c, then c is also the certainty equivalent of the compound act gc 2 A
consisting of the subact g in s and the sure amount c in every other state of S.
Formulated more compactly, in terms of a certainty equivalence function CE :
A ! R, and a conditional certainty equivalence function cce : A ! Rn, the axiom
requires that for all f 2 A, s 2 S,
(4.5) cce(f)(s) = c, CE(f cs ) = c;
with f cs dened as g
c in the denition, with g = fs.
In other words, certainty equivalents in the weak sense must have the strong
interpretation as well in the very specic `neutral' context of all other sub-acts
being sure things with the same value, so that all risk aversion will be tuned to the
second stage.
Theorem 4.4 Under assumptions (r1-5), the c-Substitution axiom denes a unique
update for CER, which coincides with cceR.
So the c-Substitution axiom constitutes a universal principle for updating prefer-
ences, implied by sequential consistency (4.2) under suitable regularity conditions.
This principle hence also applies to recursive preferences (4.1) as a special case.
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It may be illuminating to compare this rule to Bayesian updating. In line with
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993), dene for h 2 A the (single state) h-Bayesian update
for f 2 A in s 2 S by
cce(f)(s)  cce(g)(s), CE(fhs )  CE(ghs );
withfhs the result of pasting fs in h, cf. also (Siniscalchi, 2009, Section 4.1). Conse-
quentialism, or the Sure-Thing Principle, would require independency of h, cf. (Gu-
men and Savochkin, 2013, Thm. 1). For instance, the Bayes update rule (Maccheroni
et al., 2006, (6)) applies to recursive Variational Preferences, which essentially boils
down to stepwise Bayesian updating.9 In the paper Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993),
the case with h the maximum possible value of outcomes is emphasized. We take
h the constant act c that is the xed point of the monotone mapping c 7! CE(f cs ).
Therefore, we propose to call it xed-point updating.
Summarizing, sequential consistency implies a very specic form of `inconse-
quentialism' that amounts to h-Bayesian updating in each state s 2 S, with h the
xed-point sure thing. According to Theorem 4.2, if these can be combined in one
conditional update for all s 2 S jointly, it is the sequentially consistent one, other-
wise sequential updates fail to exist. This existence condition may be interpreted
as absence of tuning restrictions among mutually exclusive events, which in fact
means that essential violations of consequentialism are avoided. We refer to Roorda
and Schumacher (2007, Examples 5.3-4) for elementary examples illustrating when
sequentially consistent updates do not exist.
9The analogous result in the risk measure literature is (Follmer and Penner, 2006, Thm. 4.5),
on recursive convex risk measures. In a current working paper (Roorda and Schumacher, 2014) we
describe the update rules induced by sequential consistency for this class.
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Figure 1: The four lotteries related to the Allais paradox (payos in $million).
5 Tuned Risk Aversion and the Allais paradox
We apply TRA to the lotteries of the Allais paradox, see Figure 1. It has been
well documented that many subjects prefer a1 over a2, and a3 over a4, contrary to
the Certainty-Independence Axiom that states that preferences should not switch if
only c is changed from 0 to 1 while the sublottery is kept the same.
To become concrete, we consider an agent with preference orderings of sublotter-
ies based on exponential utility, u(x) =  e x, for some  > 0. The corresponding
(weak) certainty equivalent (ceq) of the sublottery g = (u; p; d; 1  p) is then given
by
(5.1) cce(g) :=   1

log(pe u + (1  p)e d):
Under the expected utility framework, the ceq has also the stronger interpreta-
tion that the agent is indierent to replacing g, as sublottery of a compound lottery,
by cce(g). It immediately follows that the agent's preference for a1 and a4 over
resp. a2 and a3 depends on whether cce(g) < 1 for g the sublottery in a1 and a4;
this is the case when  > 2:4.
Under TRA this strong interpretation of certainty equivalents no longer holds.
Let us, to avoid the introduction of additional parameters, assume that the agent
applies the same utility function to each stage separately. However, applying this
level of risk aversion in both stages consecutively, is considered as too conservative.
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Following TRA in its simplest form, the agent considers to limit the sum of levels
of risk aversion, by using the criterion
(5.2) CE(f) = minfce0(cce1(f)) j 0; 1  0; 0 + 1 = g:
Notice that this is sequentially consistent, and that the update is given by cce.
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We already saw that we should choose  > 2:4 in order to induce that a1 is
preferred over a2. It turns out that for the other lotteries, a3 and a4, risk aversion
is then most eective in the rst stage, i.e., the minimum in (5.2) for the other two
lotteries is achieved for 0 = . Consequently, for the second stage expected values
are considered, and hence a3 is preferred over a4 for   2:4.
Does this really solve the paradox? Nothing has been solved if one still tacitly
assumes the law of one price. After all, the Allais paradox has been designed to
reveal that dierent values of the sublottery at t = 1 play a role in decision making
at t = 0. Rather than viewing this as inconsistent, we follow the opposite direction,
and conclude that the sublottery should be represented in terms of more than one
value, if c is not yet known. Moreover, then also at t = 0, CE(f) cannot have
been the only relevant value at t =  1 for the agent. So, even though it is formally
correct to write f  CE(f), and convention dictates to articulate this as `to the
agent, f is indierent to the amount CE(f)', one should immediately add a phrase
like `if it comes to buying', `if it comes to selling', or `from a certain perspective', to
avoid the symmetric interpretation suggested by the law of one price.
In this way the Allais paradox can be interpreted as a rational eect of TRA:
in a2, all risk aversion is attracted to the sublottery, because there it has the most
eect. For the same reason, albeit somewhat less pronounced, in the lotteries a3
10Notice that CE induces ce over the rst period, i.e., for lotteries without risk in the second
stage, so both stages are treated alike in CE . The crux of TRA is hence not explicit time
dependency, but the fact that short term properties do not dictate long term features.
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and a4 conservatism is focused on the initial stage, so that the risk in the sublottery
is penalized less heavily.
We would like to avoid the impression that this should be seen as an interpreta-
tion that is alternative, or even opposite to the classical behavioral explanations in
terms of framing and regret. On the contrary, it is very much in line with it. The
dierent framing (c = 1 vs. c = 0) is precisely the reason for the dierent patterns
of risk aversion between the rst and second pair of lotteries, and the fact that a
full loss is more painful in a2 as compared to a3, nicely goes along with the fact that
under TRA one is indeed more relaxed about that risk in the latter lottery. From
this perspective, TRA may be seen as a mechanism through which these psycholog-
ical factors have their eect. Our analysis seems to indicate that they have a more
rational justication than generally believed, although we do not exclude that e.g.,
strong framing can lead to less ecient tuning of risk aversion.
To conclude this section, we depict the eect of TRA in the so-called Marschak-
Machina triangle, introduced in Marschak (1950), for the TRA preference (5.2) with
 = 3, see Figure 2. Notice the fanning out eect in the lower region, inducing the
outcome of preference orderings as described. We remark that the counter-intuitive
North-West direction of curves in the upper region can be avoided if one minimizes
over all three possible denitions of sublotteries in the Allais paradox.
6 Tuning Risk and Ambiguity Aversion:
the 50 : 51 example.
In Machina (2009) the so-called 50:51 example has been introduced, as an illustration
of limitations in the CEU approach, introduced in Schmeidler (1989), to model the
tradeo between ambiguity and risk aversion. We take our starting point in the
formulation of this example in Baillon et al. (2011), depicted in Figure 3.
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Figure 2: The Marschak-Machina triangle with level curves of the TRA preference
(5.2) with  = 3 for the Allais lotteries. At the horizontal axis is the probability p1 on
outcome 0, on the vertical probability p3 on outcome 5. The remaining probability
p2 = 1   p1   p3 is assigned to outcome 1. The lotteries of Figure 1 correspond to
the following locations: a1 : (0; 0), a2 : (0:01; 0:1), a3 : (0:9; 0:1), a4 : (0:89; 0).
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Figure 3: The four acts in the 50:51 example.
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CEU implies that f1 is preferred to f2 if and only if f3 is preferred to f4. In
Baillon et al. (2011) it is shown that the forward implication is induced in most
other classes of ambiguity-averse preferences as well. The paradox is that the in-
formational advantage of f1 with respect to f2 is much stronger than that of f3
compared to f4, and hence it is natural allow for preferences  with f1  f2 and
f3  f4. We will show that TRA admits such a preference.
To keep things as simple as possible, we consider a preference function that is
the minumum of two CEU functions. For ambiguity aversion, we use the MINVAR
criterion, introduced in Cherny and Madan (2010) in the context of bid-ask price
modeling. For simple, binary acts g = (u; p; d; (1  p)), with d  u, this amounts to
(6.1) Vk(g) = p
ku+ (1  pk)d:
We choose this form because of its strong intuition, its precise functional form is
not essential. For k an integer, the intuition is that the expected value is considered
of the minimum outcome in k independent trials. We take uniform distribution as
reference measure for the sub-acts, and choose k = 2. So the ambiguity penalty for
the sub-acts amounts to a quarter of the spread of outcomes. There is no ambiguity
in the rst stage, so we take expected values of the outcome for both sub-acts, and
dene
(6.2) Uamb =
50
101
E1 + 3E2
4
+
51
101
E3 + 3E4
4
:
The second CEU, reecting risk aversion, is again obtained from exponential utility
u(x) =  e x. The stepwise application of (5.1), with the same parameter in both
periods, is equivalent to applying this utility once to four outcomes, so we take
(6.3) U r =   1

log(
50
101
e E1 + e E2
2
+
51
101
e E3 + e E4
2
):
These are both certainty equivalence functions, and we take their minimum
outcome as nal preference function V . It turns out that the values of f1 and f2 are
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equal for for  = 0:02365. We choose  = 0:015 so that f1 is preferred over f2. The
corresponding values of the acts are given by
f1 f2 f3 f4
Uamb 151 126:25 125:25 100:5
U r 133:5 134:0 75:4 75:6
V 133:5 126:25 75:4 75:6
It follows that indeed f1  f2 and f3  f4, as desired.
We remark that TRA is certainly not the only way to cope with the 50:51 puzzle.
We just showed that adding just one bit of TRA to CEU, nothing more, is enough,
indicating that TRA extends scope of CEU in a relevant direction. We refer to
Dillenberger and Segal (2012) for an alternative solution to this puzzle in terms of
recursive preference functions.
7 Consistent decision making in the Ellsberg para-
dox
We emphasized the interpretation of a budget of risk aversion in TRA, reected by
mutual restrictions between a and b in the tuning set R. The syntax of Denition
2.1 may also be applied in a context in which such restrictions are based on dierent
considerations. For instance, if a 2 A and b 2 B correspond to the number of balls
of a certain color one supposes to be present in one and the same ambiguous urn,
it is a matter of consistency to impose a = b in R. We apply this idea to the two-
stage formulation of the Ellsberg paradox in Hanany and Klibano (2007), which is
essentially the same as the example in (Siniscalchi, 2009, Section 2)
In our notation, this can be represented as follows. Take S = fs; s0g, Ss = fB;Rg
and Ss0 = fY g as outcome space for resp. the rst stage, the sub-act in s, and the
(trivial) sub-act in s0. Here B=R=Y stands for drawing a black / red / yellow
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ball from an urn, in which 40 of the 120 balls are known to be blue, and the
remaining 80 are red or yellow, in unknown proportion (note that the symbol B has
been redened). To streamline the exposition, we let (fB; fR; fY ) 2 R3 denote the
compound act f 2 A with subact fs = (fB; B; fR; R) in state s and act fY in state
s0 leading to Y .
Following Hanany and Klibano (2007), we consider the MEU preference func-
tion
CE : (fB; fR; fY ) 7! minf1=3fB + afR + (2=3  a)fY j a 2 [1=4; 5=12]g;
which corresponds to taking the worst expected value under the assumption that the
proportion of red balls (parameter a) is not lower than 1=3  1=12, and not higher
than 1=3+1=12. Notice that CE is translation invariant, i.e., it satises CE(f+c) =
CE(f) + c; in fact it belongs to the class of coherent risk measures, introduced
in Artzner et al. (2007). Formulated in term of a tuning set, we can take R =
f(a; b) j a; b 2 [1=4; 5=12]; a = bg, cea taking expected value with probability 1=3+ a
assigned to s, and cceb taking expected value, conditioned on s, with probability
1=(1 + 3a) for B. Then indeed CER = CE. Note that the tuning restriction, a = b,
now is a matter of intrinsic consistency.
Consider now the following four acts: f = (1; 0; 0), g = (0; 1; 0), f 0 = (1; 0; 1),
g0 = (0; 1; 1). Then CE(f) = 1=3 > 1=4 = CE(g), while CE(f 0) = 7=12 < 2=3 =
CE(g0); notice that in both pairs, the ambiguity premium is 1=12.
We will argue that there is no compelling argument to deviate from the update
rule induced by c-Substitution. Illustrating the rule directly, this requires that
cce(fs) = c with c the solution of CE(1; 0; c) = c, which yields c = 4=9. Similarly,
cce(gs) must be equal to 3=7. This coincides with Bayesian updating.
In Hanany and Klibano (2007) it is argued that this constitutes a dynamic
inconsistency in terms of decision making. On the one hand, the preference of g0
over f 0 reects that at t = 0, one prefers to bet on outcome R rather than B, even
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if this decision can be postponed to t = 1. However, at t = 1, this preference is
predictably revised, because f 0s = fs is preferred over g
0
s = gs. As we have indicated
in the introduction, we also consider this as truly inconsistent (that is, in the scope of
this paper, not as a general claim); we hence do not follow the so-called consistent
planning argument in Siniscalchi (2009). The solution proposed in Hanany and
Klibano (2007) is to adjust the update rule by ruling out priors that cause the
inconsistency.
However, it is not the update rule that is to blame here, or to be adjusted, the
pitfall is again ignoring the fact that the law of one price is lost. Let us assume
that the decision maker (DM), confronted with the choice between f 0 and g0, indeed
chooses to aord g0, in line with the preference function CE. Then, at t = 1, if s
realizes, the DM has the option to exchange the bet on R for one on B; in state s0 no
further choices have to be made. Now this is a choice between (i) replacing the bet
on R by one on B, or (ii) do nothing; (i) corresponds to buying in state s the subact
h = (1; B; 1;R), which according to the updated preference has value  1=9. So
the DM will stick to the bet on R, and already knows this at t = 0. Comparing the
bid prices of both bets is is not the issue. Notice that also in case the DM would
have started with f 0, the option to switch would not have been exercised. Frictions
help to `stick to your plan'. This friction eect could shed new light on the topic of
timing indierence, as studied in e.g. Strzalecki (2013).
This illustrates once more that despite the fact that preference functions induce
a full ordering, this ordering still may be partial in the sense that it reects just one
aspect of valuation.
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8 Concluding remarks
We have introduced TRA as a natural aspect of decision making under uncertainty
that can be rationally justied if the law of one price does not hold. In our frame-
work, sequential consistency replaces recursiveness as a more exible principle ad-
justed to TRA, which induces c-Substitution as general updating rule for preferences
on acts. This rule derives a preference ordering on sub-acts from an initial preference
function, under a specic choice for the context of sub-acts, intrinsically dened by
a xed point condition, thus coping with the violations of the Sure-Thing Principle
admitted under TRA.
TRA has interesting links with several important themes in non-expected utility
that are out of the scope of this paper. Incomplete preferences can be dened, in
the spirit of Aumann (1962) and Dubra et al. (2004), by combining a family of
preferences in one overall preference, dened by the rule that an act f is `overall'-
preferred to g only when f is preferred to g under each preference in the given
family. For instance, one may compare both bid and ask prices, and deem f and
g incomparable if f is more attractive to buy, but at the same time more easily
sold than g. More generally, incomplete orderings may be dened by the condition
CE(f)  CE(g) for all  2  , cf. Section 3. Inspiration for research in this
direction may be derived from the results in Ok et al. (2012) on partial completeness.
Another possible application is prudence, see Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006).
Prudence seems inherent in TRA, in fact also if rectangular tuning sets are used for
the two-stage lottery in the denition of prudence. Non-rectangular sets, however,
may play a role in characterizing higher-order concepts related to the sign of the
k-th derivative of utility functions for k > 3, such as as temperance (k = 4) and
edginess (k=5).
Finally we indicate how TRA may support the analysis of non-recursive time
preferences, in particular hyperbolic discounting (Phelps and Pollak (1968); Laib-
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son (1997), see also Joosten (2014) for a recent application). Assuming a regular
time axis, one may rst determine maximum levels of risk aversion for each pe-
riod separately that induce an appropriate discount rate for a reference set of acts
over each time step resembling a given level of risk. The corresponding rectangular
tuning set would induce then exponential discounting. In TRA, restrictions can
be imposed for lighter discounting over multiple steps, and in particular hyperbolic
discount rates can be obtained. The results on compound risk measures in (rs13,
Section 6), and the description of all convex risk measures with prescribed stepwise
properties in (Roorda and Schumacher, 2014, Section 7) may provide useful starting
points for implementing this idea.
More generally, sequential consistency and the induced xed-point update rule
may provide a rational basis for giving long term consequences an appropriate weight
in decision making, in a way that may be substantially dierent from the mechani-
cally derived implications of local properties in a recursive approach.
9 Appendix
9.1 Regularity conditions
We rst list the standard properties of the certainty equivalence functions cea and
cceb with a 2 A and b 2 B that are assumed throughout the paper.
(p1) cea and cceb are monotone and continuous in outcomes of acts
(p2) cea and cceb are normalized on constants, i.e., cea(c) = c, cceb(c) = c
(p3) cea and cceb are non-increasing in resp. a and b.
Without loss of generality we may assume that the parameterizations are injective,
(p4) cea 6= cea0 for a 6= a0 and cceb 6= cceb0 for b 6= b0,
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since violations of (p4) can be eliminated by an obvious adjustment of the parame-
terization. Properties (p1-4) are standing assumptions in TRA.
The following three regularity conditions guarantee that the inmum dening
CER is a minimum.
(r1) A = [amin; amax] with amin < amax, B = [bmin; bmax] with bmin  bmax.
(r2) the mapping (f; a) 7! cea(f) is continuous on Asimple  A
(r3) the mapping (f; b) 7! cceb(f) is continuous on AB
Lemma 9.1 Under assumptions (r1-3), CER is continuous on A, and
CER(f) = CE R(f) = min
(a;b)2 R
cea(cceb(f));
with R the closure of R.
Proof We start with the second claim. It is easily veried that under the assump-
tions (r1-3),
(9.1) the mapping (a; b; f) 7! cea(cceb(f)) is continuous.
Due to (r1), R is bounded, and hence R is compact. So CER(f) is the minimum of
a continuous function over a compact domain, and by the Weierstrass Theorem it
follows that the inmum is a minimum. The rst equality in the lemma also follows
from (9.1).
For the rst claim, we have to prove that if fn ! f , then CER(fn) ! CER(f).
In view of the rst result, we can write hn := CER(fn) = cean(ccebn(f)) and m :=
CER(f) = cea(cceb(f)) for risk aversion levels in R. Then hn  cea(cceb(fn)) =:
h0n, and hence lim suphn  limh0n = m, where the last equality follows from (9.1).
On the other hand, m0 := lim inf hn  m, which can be seen as follows. Let (hn)n2I
be a converging subsequence, to cluster point k say. Because R is compact, there
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must be a sub-subsequence (hn)n2J with J  I, also converging to k of course,
for which (an; bn)n2J ! (a0; b0), and hence (an; bn; fn) ! (a0; b0; f). From (9.1) it
then follows that k = cea0(cceb0(f)), so k  m. Because m0 is the inmum of all
clusterpoints k, also m0  m. 
Under (r1), the maximal tuning set representing CER exists, and is given by
(9.2) Rmax = f(a; b) 2 AB j cea(cceb(f))  CER(f) for all f 2 Ag:
It follows from the previous lemma that this is a closed set under (r1-3).
For some results we assume the following sensitivity property of cea, for f 2 A
bounded by a constant d:
(r4) f  d) cea(f) < d and f 	 d) cea(f) > d.
A slightly stricter version of (p4) for second stage acts is needed in the theorems.
(r5) For all pairs of vectors b0  b, with b0(s) < b(s), and all c 2 R, there exist
f 2 A such that cceb(f)(s) = c < cceb0(f)(s).
9.2 Proof of Prop. 4.1
It is clear that the implication in (4.3) is a consequence of (4.2). It remains to
show that if (4.2) is violated, (4.3) cannot hold true. So assume that for some f ,
CE(f) < min cce(f) =: m (the proof for CE(f) > max cce(f) is entirely analogous).
Then there must exist g 2 A, with g  0, such that cce(f   g)(s) = m for all s 2 S
(this follows easily from the standing assumptions (p1-2) for cce, cf. Section 9.1).
On the other hand, CE(f   g)  CE(f) < m, contradicting (4.3).
9.3 Proof of Thm. 4.2
We prove the rst claim using (4.3). So consider f 2 A with cce(f) = c. Condition
(i) in the theorem implies that CER(f)  inf(a;b)2R cea(cce(f)) = inf(a;b)2R cea(c) =
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c. From condition (ii) it follows that there exists a 2 A with (a; ) 2 R, and hence
CER(f)  cea(cce)(f) = cea(c) = c. So equality must hold, and (4.3) follows.
For the claim on uniqueness, consider a function cce : A ! Rn that is normalized
on constants, and assume cce 6= cceR . So there exist f 2 A and s 2 S such that
c := cce(f)(s) 6= cceR(f)(s) =: c0:
Dene the act f cs as the sure thing c on S with in s the act c replaced by fs. Observe
that cce(f cs ) = c, in all states in S, because cce is normalized on constants.
If c0 < c, then cceb(f cs )  c for some b 2 B, and hence CER(f cs )  ceamin(cceb(f cs )) <
c, where the strict inequality is due to (r4) (see (r1) above for the notation amin).
So (4.3) is violated for f cs . Similarly, for the case c < c
0, we show that CER(f cs ) > c.
Clearly
(9.3) CER(f
c
s )  inf
(a;b)2R
cea( inf
b02R1
cceb0(f
c
s ));
with R1 the set dened by (4.4). Let g 2 Rn denote the inner (point-wise) inmum.
Then g 	 c, and (r4) implies that CER(f cs ) > c. So also if c < c0, (4.3) does not
hold, and hence c0 = c. This proves that cceR is indeed the only candidate for a
sequentially consistent update of CER.
For the last claim, notice that under (r1) the maximal tuning set Rmax is in-
deed given by (9.2), and that Rmax is closed under (r1-3). It follows that Rmax1 =
fb j (amin; b) 2 Rmaxg, and that for all s 2 S, Rmax(s) = maxfb(s) j (amin; b) 2
Rmaxg. Obviously Rmax  R, and we show that equality must hold. Indeed, if
v := Rmax(s) = R(s) +  for some s 2 S and  > 0, then, due to (p4), there would
exists a sub-act fs in s with cceR(f)(s) =: c > ccev(f)(s), so that CER(f
c
s ) = c,
while, by (r4) for ceamin , ceamin(ccev(f
c
s )) < c; a contradiction with (9.2), as v = b(s)
for some (amin; b) 2 Rmax.
So R = Rmax , and it follows from the rst claim that cceR is a sequentially
consistent update if Rmax1 satises condition (ii).
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It remains to derive the reverse implication: if cceR is sequentially consistent,
then R 2 Rmax1 . If R = bmin, the claim is trivial. Otherwise, the subset S 0 :=
fs 2 S j R(s)    2 Bg in non-empty for suciently small  > 0. According
to (r5), we can choose c 2 R, and nd f 2 L such that cceR(f) = c, while
cceb0(f)(s) > c whenever b
0(s)  R(s)  . Now if cceR is a sequentially consistent
update, CER(f) = c, and hence cea(cceb(f)) = c for some (a
; b) 2 Rmax. In view
of (r4) for cea , it must hold that cceb(f) = c, and hence b
(s)  R(s)    for
all s 2 S. As  can be chosen arbitrarily small, and Rmax1 is closed, it follows that
R 2 Rmax1 .
9.4 Proof of Thm. 4.4
First show that cceR satises the c-Substitution axiom. To derive the forward im-
plication in (4.5), take f 2 A, s 2 S, and let c = cceR(f)(s). Then CER(f cs ) 
ceamin(cceR(f
c
s )) = ceamin(c) = c. The reverse inequality is obvious from the deni-
tion of R, so CER(f
c
s ) = c. For the backward implication in (4.5), which immedi-
ately implies uniqueness of updates, assume CER(f
c
s ) = c. From Lemma 9.1, generalize
aspects to
CE; cce
(9.4) CER(f
c
s ) = cea(cceb(f
c
s )) for some (a
; b) 2 R:
By denition of R, b
(s)  R(s), so cceb(f)(s)  c, and equality follows from
(r4). So cceR indeed satises the c-Substitution axiom.
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